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Abstract: This text introduces the twin deadlocks of strong artificial life. 
Conceptualization of life is a deadlock both because of the existence of a 
continuum between the inert and the living, and because we only know one 
instance of life. Computationalism is a second deadlock since it remains a matter 
of faith. Nevertheless, artificial life realizations quickly progress and recent 
constructions embed an always growing set of the intuitive properties of life. This 
growing gap between theory and realizations should sooner or later crystallize in 
some kind of “paradigm shift” and then give clues to break the twin deadlocks. 
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1 Introduction 
“The ultimate goal of the study of artificial life would be to create ‘life’ in some 
other medium, ideally a virtual medium where the essence of life has been 
abstracted from the details of its implementation in any particular hardware. We 
would like to build models that are so life-like that they cease to be models of life 
and become examples of life themselves.” (Langton, 1986, p. 147, original 
emphasis). 
This statement launched a large debate among biologists, philosophers and 
computer scientists. It defined what is now known as strong artificial life i.e. the 
fact that artificial life is not limited to theoretical biology or biomimetic artefacts, 
but can be extended to the creation of new instances of life, possibly independent 
of any material medium. With the emergence of artificial life as a scientific field, 
the question of the creation of life by men therefore left the fields of religion or 
superstition to join the scope of science. 
Nearly two decades later, the debate about strong artificial life remains very 
active. Despite remarkable realizations — such as Venus (Rasmussen, 1990), 
Tierra (Ray, 1992) or Cosmos (Taylor, 1999a) — and pompous declarations such 
as the famous How I Created Life in a Virtual Universe (Ray, 1993), we still have 
no strong demonstration of the feasibility of strong artificial life. 
The problem was nicely introduced by a provocative reasoning presented by 
S. Rasmussen at the second artificial life workshop (Rasmussen, 1992): 
 
I. A universal computer at the Turing machine level can simulate any 
physical process (Physical Church-Turing thesis). 
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II. Life is a physical process (von Neumann). 
III. There exist criteria by which we are able to distinguish living from non-
living objects. 
Accepting (I), (II) and (III) implies the possibility of life in a computer. 
IV. An artificial organism must perceive a reality R2, which for it is just as 
real as our “real” reality R1 is for us. 
V. R1 and R2 have the same ontological status. 
VI. It is possible to learn something about fundamental properties of 
realities in general, and of R1 in particular, by studying the details of 
different R2’s. An example of such a property is the physics of a reality. 
 
Even though points (IV) to (VI) tend to justify the huge potential contribution 
of “artificial realizations” to science, yet, point (I) (computationalism) on the one 
hand and points (II) and (III) (concept of life) on the other hand found what can be 
called the twin deadlocks of strong artificial life. 
This chapter will first present both deadlocks and show the current limits of 
purely theoretical approaches. It will then present some recent realizations and 
show the growing gap between the relative stagnation of theory and the progress 
of experiments. Finally, it will examine the consequences of this hiatus. 
 
2 On the Concept of Life 
Life is obvious; a five years old boy can easily distinguish an inert object from a 
living one. Nevertheless, thousands pages have been written since Aristotle about 
the concept of life, and the problem remains clearly unsolved. Some definitions 
are essentially conceptual, they try to propose a strong theoretical basis for life. 
Because of the difficulty to define a unifying concept, other definitions are mainly 
empirical and based on the observation and the research of apparent invariants. 
2.1 Limits of conceptual definitions of life 
According to Dawkins, the word “living” does not necessarily refer to something 
definite in the real world (Dawkins, 1996, p. 39). For him, the systems we call 
“living” emerged from a cumulative and very progressive process favoring the 
most efficient replicators i.e. the replicators which had the best ability to embed a 
“surviving machine”. That is therefore the same processes which were at work 
from the formation of the first “soap bubbles” to the emergence of robust 
replicators. This suggests a continuity between living and non-living. It is then not 
possible to define a clear borderline dividing the inert on the one hand and the 
living on the other hand. 
There is now a growing consensus among biologists concerning this 
continuity : “It seems more appropriate to consider life as a continuum property of 
organizational patterns, with some more or less alive than others.” (Farmer & 
Belin, 1992, p. 819). “Life is not an absolute quality which suddenly appeared, it 
gradually emerged at the beginning of the evolution. […] there is no clear 
boundary line.” (Cairns-Smith, 1990, p. 14). “Presumably, life emerged in a 
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gradual, long-term process whereby primitive proto-organisms were created in the 
teeming, primal soup of the seas. Life is still not completed; it is a partly 
indefinite phenomenon of becoming, not a completely determined state of being.” 
(Emmeche, 1994, p. 37). 
The fact that all the dominant modern theories consider that life progressively 
emerged from some kind of proto-organisms, strongly grounds the hypothesis of 
the existence of a large and blurring borderline between living and non-living, 
were the inert progressively fades into the living. This continuity makes the 
conceptualization of life a very difficult task, since it should exist “half-living” or 
“quite-living” systems. Main concepts of life fail to manage this continuum. Let 
us see some significant examples. 
2.1.1 Life: dissipative structures 
Famous physicist E. Schrödinger first proposed in 1944 an explicitly 
thermodynamic definition of life: “What is the characteristic feature of life? When 
is a piece of matter said to be alive? When it goes on ‘doing something’, moving, 
exchanging material with its environment (…) It is by avoiding the rapid decay 
into the inert state of ‘equilibrium’ that an organism appears so enigmatic (…) 
How does the living organism avoid decay? The obvious answer is: By eating, 
drinking, breathing and (in the case of plants) assimilating. The technical term is 
metabolism.” (Schrödinger, 1986, pp. 168-171, original emphasis). 
For Schrödinger, life is foremost the capacity for a material system to 
maintain its thermodynamic disequilibrium toward the environment. According to 
the Nobel Prize Ilya Prigogine (Nicolis & Prigogine, 1977), such systems are 
conceptualized as “dissipative structures”, i.e. structures in which non linear 
interactions, while consuming energy and through phase transitions, are driven to 
a more complex, unpredictable organization. 
It is now largely admitted that living systems are dissipative structures; that 
by using energy they are able to create order out of chaos, but this property is also 
known to be insufficient to define life. Many dissipative structures are clearly 
inert (candle flames, vortexes…). 
Conceptualization of dissipative structures strongly relies on “bifurcations”, 
“symmetry breaks” or “phase transitions”. The evolution toward dissipative 
structures is then very sudden; there is no smooth evolution but catastrophic 
transformations. This concept therefore clearly violates the continuity of the 
transition from inert to living. 
2.1.2 Life : autopoietic systems 
Looking for a definition of life in cognitive science, H. Maturana and F. Varela 
proposed a more sophisticated approach based upon autonomy and self-reference 
(Maturana & Varela, 1974). They conceptualized life as an  autopoietic system: 
“An autopoietic system is organized as a network of processes of production 
of components which: (a) through their transformations and interactions 
continuously regenerate the network of processes that produced them, and (b) 
constitute the system as a concrete unity in the space in which it exists by 
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specifying the topological domain of its realization as a network.” (Varela, 1989, 
p. 45, original emphasis). 
Self-reference and operational closure are interpreted as the root properties of 
the construction of an identity which is dynamically self-preserved, i.e. which is 
able to react to environmental perturbations in such a way that it can preserve its 
own internal equilibrium (autopoiesis can then be interpreted as an extension of 
homeostasis). Autopoiesis is what distinguishes living systems from inert ones: 
“Autopoiesis in the physical space is a necessary and sufficient condition for a 
system to be a living one.” (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 84). 
The reference to the physical space means that living systems are necessarily 
metabolic systems, and allows to distinguish them from systems which can be 
seen as autopoietic but not alive (societies for example —see Boden, 2000). 
The autopoietic definition of life is very elegant. It conceptualizes life with a 
unique and fundamental concept, which seems to be accurate and adequately 
adapted to observation. But once more, this definition is insufficient. Some 
physical phenomenon, like Bénard cells, are autopoietic systems in the physical 
space, but are nevertheless clearly inert. It has been argued that this problem could 
be overcome by adding a simple condition: living systems are autopoietic systems 
in the physical space which embed a self-description (Heudin, 1994). This 
addition is useful but ad hoc. 
Because of operational closure, autopoiesis also violates the continuity 
property of life. A system is operationally closed or not, half-closure is 
impossible. Therefore autopoiesis is an either/or property, a system can’t be 
semiautopoietic. 
2.1.3 Life: adaptive systems 
In order to propose a unifying concept of life, some authors (e.g. Cairns-Smith, 
1990; Maynard Smith & Szathmáry, 1995) emphasized the evolutionary property 
of the living. Thus, according to E. Mayr: “We shall regard as alive any 
population of entities which has the properties of multiplication, heredity and 
variation.” (Mayr, 1975, pp. 96-97). In the field of artificial life, the most famous 
evolutionary definition is the “supple adaptation” concept of M. Bedau (Bedau, 
1996; Bedau, 1998a). Supple adaptation refers to the fact that living systems have 
an unending capacity to find new unpredictable adaptive solutions to 
unanticipated changes in the environment. 
“(…) the entity that is living in the primary sense of that term is the supplely 
adapting system itself. Other entities that are living are living in a secondary sense 
by virtue of bearing an appropriate relationship to a supplely adapting system.” 
(Bedau, 1996, p. 339, original emphasis). 
That is therefore the whole population which is “primary” living. The 
individuals are living only because of their relationship to the supplely adapting 
system constituted by the population. 
Such a definition is highly counter-intuitive, since it is very difficult to accept 
life as a population property. Moreover, Bedau does not really answer the problem 
of the eventuality of long periods of evolutive stability (stasis). Despite this 
stability, the individuals living there would clearly be alive. 
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This is nevertheless one of the most attractive modern definitions. It is both 
concise and able to manage problematic cases such as mules or viruses, and even 
spores or frozen sperm (which are dormant and then temporarily not connected to 
the living system they belong to). 
According to Bedau (Bedau, 1998a), the supple adaptation definition 
conforms to the continuity hypothesis. The same way life is a matter of degree, 
supple adaptation can vary to different degrees. But even though the supple 
adaptation capabilities can grow or decrease, there is nevertheless a clear 
distinction between adaptive systems and not-adaptive ones, even when this 
adaptability is close to zero. We now have many proofs of the unity of life (e.g. 
the universality of the genetic code, the chirality of biological molecules…). 
Therefore, the oldest self-replicating structures life descends from were already 
(potentially) supplely adapting structures. 
 
These examples —which are representative of important classes of conceptual 
definitions of life— show how difficult it is to manage the continuity from nonlife 
to life, and the growing gap between life theories and what biology thinks life 
originates from. It has been argued that this continuity is not a real problem, since, 
for example, the continuity from green to blue doesn’t prevent the recognition of 
both colors. In fact, this doesn’t prove anything, since neither green, nor blue 
really exist, both colors have been arbitrarily defined, the same way the A note in 
music has been defined to be a 440 Hz sound. 
This doesn’t mean that a conceptual definition of life is impossible, even 
though such a conceptualization will inevitably embed some arbitrarily set 
borderline (or “borderzone”), but we still lack a concept able to cover the whole 
range from non living to living. Continuity remains one of the main obstacles on 
the way toward a theory of life. 
2.2 Cluster definitions of life 
Considering the difficulty of a conceptual definition of life, some researchers have 
tried to propose an empirical approach based on observation and the identification 
of invariants. The definitions used by the general public are of this type. Thus, 
according to Merriam-Webster dictionary, life is: 
 
• The state of a material complex or individual characterized by the 
capacity to perform certain functional activities including metabolism, 
growth, reproduction, and some form of responsiveness or adaptability. 
 
Life is seen as the result of a complex material organization which performs 
some specific tasks. Such a definition doesn’t say anything about this 
organization, it only considers life as a cluster of properties (growth, self-
reproduction…). Such definitions are common. In the field of artificial life, the 
most famous cluster definition is that of Farmer and Belin who selected eight 
criteria (Farmer & Belin, 1992, p. 818): 
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1. Life is a pattern in spacetime. 
2. Self-reproduction. 
3. Information storage of a self-representation. 
4. Metabolism. 
5. Functional interactions with the environment. 
6. Interdependence of parts. 
7. Stability under perturbations. 
8. Ability to evolve. 
 
This definition is often used because of its efficiency. It is difficult to remove 
a property and (usually) not necessary to add a new one. It nevertheless poses two 
main problems: 
 
• It is not sufficient to identify all forms of life. For example, it doesn’t 
efficiently qualify viruses or the proto-organisms that are supposed to be 
at the origin of life. 
• It doesn’t say anything about what life is, it only notices an empirical 
and intuitive set of properties without giving any explanation of their 
origins. 
 
All the definitions of life based on a set of properties share the second 
problem. Being essentially empirical, they are unable to explain why they have to 
consider a given property. 
The issue is how to select meaningful properties? For example, why to 
include self-reproduction, or evolvability? Both these properties can be seen as 
qualifying life, but they only have been considered relatively to the sole example 
of life we know, nothing proves that they qualify life itself. 
This problem has no direct solution since any empirical definition of life is 
necessarily based on “life as we know it” and not on “life as it could be”. This is 
known as the Small Sample Problem: “The Small Sample Problem is the problem 
of determining from a small sample (in this case a sample of one) which features 
of some things (in this case, life) are essential to that thing.” (Cameron, 2000). 
One of the main purposes of science is to determine fundamental invariants, how 
to define invariants with only one instance of a phenomenon? 
This doesn’t mean that defining life is impossible, but that, as far as we only 
know earth life, it is impossible to base it only on purely observational features, 
one inevitably needs some general theory or principles to overcome this problem. 
 
More than 2,000 years after Aristotle works, the concept of life then clearly 
remains to be defined. The continuity problem and the small sample problem 
make the question quasi insoluble. Because of the small sample problem, it is 
impossible to strongly ground life invariants. Because of the continuity problem, 
it is very difficult to find a conceptual definition able to manage the (possibly 
large) area between the inert and the living (even though it is theoretically 
possible). This is such a fundamental problem, that the question of the scientific 
status of life remains open: 
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“(…) ‘life’ may not be a scientifically grounded category (such as water, or 
tiger) whose real properties unify and underlie the similarities observed in all 
those things we call ‘alive’. Instead, it may pick out a rag-bag of items with no 
fundamental unity.” (Boden, 1996, p. 1). Yet, the only way we have to define life, 
is to find processes or principles which could explain why some specific features 
are gathered in living systems (complexity, evolvability…): “In the final analysis, 
the nature of life will be settled by whatever provides the best explanation of the 
rich range of natural phenomena that seem to characterize living systems.” 
(Bedau, 2003). It means that the so-called “intuitive properties of life” remain of 
central importance. Computational constructions generating a great deal of these 
properties could demonstrate some essential principles regarding life. 
3 On Computationalism 
“[Those who know automata] will consider the body as a machine which, being 
built by God, is infinitely best organized (…) than any machine built by men (…) 
if there were such machines having the organs and the face of a monkey (…) we 
couldn’t recognize that they are not of the same nature as these animals.” 
(Descartes, 1999, pp. 69-70). 
Published in 1637, this sentence shows that computationalism is not a new 
idea. The form of computationalism proposed by René Descartes is very different 
from the modern one (notably because of the dualism, which considers that the 
mind has to be interpreted in a different way than the body), but the fundamental 
idea is already present: the body is a machine. 
In modern science, this idea is formally based on the so-called physical 
Church-Turing thesis, which can strongly be interpreted this way: “(…) any 
physical process can be thought of as a computation, therefore any physical 
process can be re-created in a computational medium.” (Helmreich, 1998, p. 75). 
On this basis, functionalism (which is an enlarged version of computationalism, 
not limited to computers) poses the possibility of multiple-realizability. Just as 
there are different ways to realize, for example, means of transport (cars, planes, 
roller skates…), there are different ways to realize a mind or a living being. The 
important point is not the physical realization but the properties of the system. The 
ultimate consequence of this thesis in the field of artificial life is that: “(…) 
artificial life is possible precisely because living organisms themselves are types 
of machines that can reproduce themselves. And since a machine’s functions —its 
logic— can in principle always be imitated in new constructions (whether with the 
same or other material is unimportant), it follows that life itself, the organic 
machine can be constructed.” (Emmeche, 1994, p. 49, original emphasis). 
Therefore emerges: “(…) the idea that computers are instances of biological 
process.” (Sober, 1996, p. 362). 
The idea that a discrete computing system can realize any physical process 
has recently been promoted to a “Principle” by Stephen Wolfram with his 
Principle of Computational Equivalence (Wolfram, 2002) which assumes that all 
non trivial processes, natural or produced by humans, can be viewed as 
computations, and that those computations are of equivalent sophistication. 
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Despite apparently strong mathematical and philosophical bases, 
computationalism (and functionalism) is strongly debated. Some objections are 
essentially formal. For example, it has never been proved that a digital computing 
system is equivalent to an analog one. On the contrary, it has been proved that 
some analog computing devices could have super-Turing capabilities. H. 
Siegelmann (Siegelmann, 1995) showed for example that analog recurrent neural 
networks could perform operations beyond the capabilities of Turing machines. 
More generally, Copeland and Sylvan showed that “(…) the set of well-defined 
computations is not exhausted by the computations that can be carried out by a 
Turing machine.” (Copeland & Sylvan, 1999, p. 46). But these proofs are 
controversial since the considered machines seem impossible to be physically 
realized. 
Others objections are more philosophical and based on notions such as 
representation or semantic, the most famous being the Chinese room experiment 
of Searle (very briefly: if you have an appropriate set of rules, you can write an 
answer in chinese to a chinese question without understanding a word of chinese 
—Searle, 1990). Even though it has been argued that this experiment doesn’t 
apply to artificial life (Anderson & Copeland, 2003), it remains one of the most 
discussed objection. 
The problem of implementation also remains completely open. Pushing the 
idea of a correspondence between physical states and computation to the limit 
even tend to empty computationalism: “if (…) it could be shown that for any 
computational description and any given physical system, one can find ‘physical 
states’ of that system that can be set in correspondence with the computational 
ones and are, furthermore, appropriate (…) then computational explanations 
would be in danger: every system could then be seen to compute! In other words, 
computationalism would be vacuous if every physical system could be viewed as 
implementing every computation.” (Scheutz, 2002). 
The debate between computationalists and their critics is an unending one; 
each argument always has its counter-argument. Fundamentally, 
computationalism essentially remains a matter of faith since, no matter of the 
precision of a measurement and of the result, detractors of computationalism can 
always say that a finer measurement would show a continuum and supporters that 
it would show discrete processes (Sullins, 2001). Therefore, and as long as a 
deeper concept of the ontological status of computational realizations has not 
emerged, computationalism can neither be proved, nor be refuted (see Delahaye, 
2002). 
 
4 On Realizations 
The twin deadlocks of strong artificial life don’t prevent the multiplication of 
experiments which present more and more properties of life as we know it. 
A decade after its presentation, the most famous experiment remains Tom 
Ray’s Tierra (Ray, 1992), some kind of artificial universe where matter is 
represented by CPU instructions, energy by CPU time and space by computer 
memory, in which algorithmic “creatures” mutate and self-reproduce. Ray 
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circumvented the problem of life definition by asserting that to be living, a system 
only has to be capable of self-replication and open-ended evolution. Open-ended 
evolution refers to “(…) a system in which components continue to evolve new 
forms continuously, rather than grinding to a halt when some sort of ‘optimal’ or 
stable position is reached.” (Taylor, 1999b, p. 34). 
Ray’s results have been sufficiently impressive to give rise to comments such 
as: “From a purely logical point of view, the barrier between life and artificial life 
seemed to have come down: the universality of life was proven.” (Adami, 1998, 
p. 49). 
C. Emmeche examined Ray’s creatures according to Farmer and Belin’s eight 
criteria (Emmeche, 1994, p. 43-46): 
 
1. Ray’s creatures are information structures rather than material objects. 
2. They are able to self-reproduce. 
3. They have self-representation. 
4. They have some kind of metabolism since they redistribute some of the 
computer’s electrical energy. 
5. They have functional interactions with their environment. 
6. Their components are mutually interdependent and they can die. 
7. They are stable in their environment. 
8. They can evolve. 
 
According to Emmeche, only the properties 2 (self-reproduction is essentially 
formal, it doesn’t consume any “matter”), 4 (is it reasonable to consider 
alterations of electromagnetic states as a metabolism?) and 7 (the considered 
stability is very weak) are not fully satisfied. 
The question here is not to say that Ray’s creatures are “quite living”, but to 
point out that such a construction satisfies many of the intuitive properties of life. 
Despite strong criticism, Tierra inspired many works, the most accomplished 
ones being Avida (Adami, 1998) or Cosmos (Taylor, 1999a). Tierra-like 
“creatures” are most probably one of the closest from life realizations. 
Nevertheless it is very difficult to consider them as living. Tierra’s creatures even 
don’t comply Ray’s definition of life. Actually, it has been shown that these 
constructions don’t really support “open-ended” evolution. Using some 
“evolutionary activity” indicators, Bedau et al. (Bedau, Snyder, Titus Brown, & 
Packard, 1997) showed that the evolutionary process in these constructions is 
quantitatively and qualitatively different from the biosphere. In the real world, the 
evolutionary process seems to never stagnate. Biosphere always proposes new 
environments, new niches and allows growing adaptive successes. On the 
contrary, with Evita (a Tierra-like —see Bedau & Titus Brown, 1999) or Bugs (an 
animat-like —see Packard, 1989), after a phase of growth, adaptive success 
quickly stagnates and remains constant. Similar results have been obtained (Ward, 
2000) with Tierra and Echo (Holland, 1992). 
Two main problems are generally pointed out to explain the inability of 
Tierra-like constructions to generate an unending evolutionary process: (1) the 
environment is both small and insufficiently diversified; (2) the “biochemical” 
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laws are set by the creator and are quite simple and fixed. Unlike in the real world, 
there is no possibility of selection of an efficient set of chemical processes 
eventually able to support open-ended evolution. 
Some recent constructions propose ways to overcome these limits. The 
available space can be greatly enlarged by using Internet; that was the idea of 
Tom Ray when he proposed NetTierra (Ray, 1995) which was first implemented 
in 1997 between universities all around the world. Ray thinks that like in 
Amazonia where the diversity relies more on the multiplication of interactions 
between species than on the specificity of the ecological substrate, the complexity 
of the digital organisms and of their interactions in NetTierra could lead to a self-
sustained evolutionary dynamic (Ray, 2001). 
The problem of the construction of an endosemantic evolutionary 
environment is more complex. Pargellis recently proposed Amoeba-II (Pargellis, 
2001), an environment designed to test the “spontaneous” emergence of self-
replicating “creatures”. Unlike Amoeba-I (Pargellis, 1996), the assembler of 
Amoeba-II is Turing-universal and allows the system to partially define its own 
genetic code. With this work, Pargellis is close to the growing field of Artificial 
Chemistry, which tries to build systems similar to the real chemical system, and to 
analyze the origin of evolutionary units (Dittrich, 2001). 
Yet, artificial chemistries, despite great success in various fields, failed to 
produce an open-ended evolutionary system, but recent developments tend to 
show that it could be possible. New approaches try to embed artificial creatures in 
their environment i.e. try not to differentiate the constituents of the environment 
and of the creatures (one notices that this also is one of the directions suggested 
by the “next generation” of computationalism —see Sheutz 2002). Therefore 
important properties (e.g. self-replication of the genome) are implicitly encoded. 
“[To realize open-ended evolutionary systems] no representational distinction 
should exist between phenotypes and the abiotic environment. Rather, the 
important representational distinction is between genotypes (viewed as relatively 
inert, symbolic structures) and phenotypes plus abiotic environment (a dynamical 
system).” (Taylor, 2002b, p. 12). This approach tries to realize the “semantic 
closure” of Pattee: “(…) self-reference that has open-ended evolutionary potential 
is an autonomous closure between the dynamics (physical laws) of the material 
aspects and the constraints (syntactic rules) of the symbolic aspects of a physical 
organization. I have called this self-referent relation semantic closure (…).” 
(Pattee, 1995, see also Rocha, 2001). Such a construction could lead to “creative 
evolution” (Taylor, 2002c), allowing complex mechanisms such as exaptation 
(modification of the use of a character) to occur. First results have been obtained 
with EvoCA (Taylor, 2002b), where the environment is represented by a layer 
made of a cellular automaton (physical laws, then dynamic) and the genotypes by 
a specific second layer (syntactic rules, then inert). Each genotype controls a 
given cell in the first layer (also using preconditions specified by the 
neighborhood of the cell) and —in the first version— evolves through a genetic 
algorithm (figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Layers structure of EvoCA. The figure shows how a genome controls a 
particular cell, using conditional genes linked to the neighborhood. The position 
of the controlled cell is relative to that of the genotype. (Taylor, 2002a). 
 
Yet, EvoCA is still in its infancy. Taylor only demonstrated the capacity of its 
construction to support an evolutionary process. According to a given goal (a 
specific configuration of the cellular automaton) EvoCA has evolved a structure 
with a more than 80% fitness (figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2: Goal, initial configuration and final result where one can distinguish the 
letters EvoCA (non-quiescent cells are lights) (Taylor, 2002b). 
 
The next step (EvoCA-B) supposes the suppression of the external goals and 
the use of endogenous selection. Individuals will have to survive and to reproduce 
(Taylor, 2002b). Syntactic rules will have to construct the right compromise with 
the dynamic of the cellular automaton. By defining fitness through the dynamic of 
the cellular automaton —i.e. by suppressing any externally defined goal— the 
system will try to approach semantic closure. According to Taylor, by succeeding, 
these works could lead to systems capable of supporting autopoietic, self-
replicating structures. EvoCA-B still has to prove its capabilities and the system 
remains far from a really endogenous one. Nevertheless, this is a promising 
attempt to unify phenotypes and the abiotic environment, which is an essential 
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prerequisite on the way toward autopoietic structures capable of an open-ended 
evolutionary dynamic. 
Important progresses have also been made in the construction of multi-
cellular, self-replicating systems. D. Mange et al. recently proposed the Tom 
Thumb algorithm “[that] will make it possible to design a self-replicating loop 
with universal construction and universal computation that can easily be 
implemented into silicon.” (Mange, Stauffer, Petraglio, & Tempesti, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 3: The minimum cell is made of four molecules (2×2) storing three 
hexadecimal values, and the original genome is a string of six hexadecimal values 
(step 0). One sees the first cell (step 12) and the construction of 3 daughters cells. 
(Mange, Stauffer, Petraglio, & Tempesti, 2003). 
 
Mange et al. demonstrated that the Tom Thumb algorithm is able of universal 
construction and computation. It means that it is theoretically possible to realize a 
self-replicating loop of an arbitrary complexity. Such a construction could notably 
be of very high interest in the field of nanotechnologies where self-replication is 
of central importance (see for example Drexler, 1987; Roco, 2002). 
Implemented in FPGA (Biowall, see Tempesti, Mange, Stauffer, & Teuscher, 
2002), the results are so impressive that Mange et al. tried to test its conformance 
to Varela, Maturana and Uribe autopoiesis checklist (Varela, Maturana, & Uribe, 
1974): 
 
• The cell has identifiable boundaries. 
• It is made of a set of parts. 
• The functioning depends on complex interactions between 
components. 
• The boundaries result from mutual interactions between neighborhood 
constituents. 
• That is the same process that produces boundaries and the cell itself. 
• All constituents are produced by other constituents. 
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“Our self-replicating loop with universal construction is thus an autopoietic 
cell in the space within its molecule exists. According to Varela et al., such an 
autopoietic cell has the phenomenology of a living system.” (Mange, Stauffer, 
Petraglio, & Tempesti, 2003). Mange et al. of course don’t consider this 
construction as living, but they show that this construction embed some very 
specific properties of living systems, particularly a sort of autopoietic dynamic. 
 
Both EvoCA and Tom Thumb algorithm are only illustrative examples, but 
they clearly show that recent developments lead to constructions embedding an 
always growing set of the intuitive properties of life. The universality of Tom 
Thumb algorithm could lead to self-replicating constructions of an arbitrary 
complexity. Ultimately, descendants of EvoCA-like constructions could lead to 
operationally closed evolutive structures, intimately embedded in a dynamic 
environment (then having some metabolic capacities), capable of self-replication 
and self-maintenance. 
Recently, S. Rasmussen et al. presented their works on proto-organisms 
(Rasmussen, Chen, Nilsson, & Abe, 2003). They consider as living proto-
organisms having the ability to evolve, to self-reproduce, to metabolize, to 
respond adaptively to environmental changes, and to die. Once again, we are far 
from the objective, but, because of their materiality, anybody which would 
examine such proto-organisms would undoubtedly consider them as living. Even 
though they won’t be based on DNA, no essential property would differentiate 
this form of artificial life from life as we know it. What about future 
computational realizations also embedding these properties? According to Olson: 
“It seems to me that computer-generated organisms are problematic for the same 
reason as computer-generated mountains are.” (Olson, 1995, p. 1). This argument 
is common but not tenable. A simulation is controlled by its designers. On the 
contrary, the self-organization dynamic of artificial worlds —e.g. complex 
transients in class IV cellular automata (Wolfram, 1984)— emerges from the local 
“physical laws”. Likewise, the properties of the “potentially living” systems will 
emerge from the interactions between semantic rules and physical laws. The 
properties characterizing these constructions will be the consequences of the own 
dynamic of the computational environment, not of the decisions of the designer 
(who is anyway unable to predict the evolution of its construction). These 
emergences demonstrate that specific properties such as self-reproduction or 
evolvability are multiply realizable. The process is then ontologically different 
from simulations. 
One can always argue that even though some computational constructions are 
not mere simulations, it is possible to consider that a second order reality doesn’t 
have the same ontological status than a first order one. For example, Sullins 
considers that Rasmussen’s points IV and V, we presented above, are circular: 
“[Rasmussen] is making the claim that an artificial reality created in the computer 
is able to capture all of the essential qualities of our reality (R1 is equal to R2) as 
long as living agents are interacting with the system, but the artificial reality must 
already be ontologically equivalent to our reality in order to produce truly living 
artificial life forms.” (Sullins, 1997). This argument is very interesting, but “Why 
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should one have priority over the other?” (Rasmussen, 1992, p. 770), and what 
about our reality (which furthermore is not proved to be of first order) were life 
undoubtedly exists? 
In this context, it seems to us that the philosophical basis to consider proto-
organisms as living, and “virtual” organisms (i.e. belonging to a so-called second 
order reality) having the same emergent properties as mere simulations, are quite 
weak. 
 
5 Conclusion 
“The borders between the living and the nonliving, between the Nature-made and 
the human-made appear to be constantly blurring.” (Sipper, 2002, p. 222). Nearly 
twenty years after the official birth of artificial life, and despite a huge amount of 
very high quality philosophical works, the problem of the realization of strong 
artificial life remains with no nearer solution. It has been said that artificial life is 
de facto  a symptom of the “end of science” (J. Horgan quoted in Sullins, 2001) 
but, opposite to purely philosophical works, computer simulations never ceased to 
progress. Progresses in artificial life constructions will necessarily contribute to 
the evolution of philosophical thought at least in two ways: 
 
• They will help to validate hypothesis and thought experiments. J. 
Sullins (Sullins, 2001) considers computer simulation as a tool for what 
he called “the new computer assisted discovery process”; the best 
example being von Neumann self-replicating cellular automata which 
demonstrated a process similar to the biological one, discovered some 
years later. Bedau also greatly emphasizes the capability of artificial life 
to help the emergence and the validation of philosophical hypothesis: 
“Artificial life simulations are in effect thought experiments; but 
emergent thought experiments. (…) What is distinctive about emergent 
thought experiments is that what they reveal can be discerned only by 
simulation; armchair analysis in these contexts is simply inconclusive. 
Synthesizing emergent thought experiments with a computer is a new 
technique that philosophers can adapt from artificial life.” (Bedau, 1998b, 
p. 144, original emphasis). New simulations, associated with new 
hypothesis on the origin of a given life property (moreover a given set of 
life properties) will necessarily increase in the coming years. 
Comparisons between artificial systems and real living ones will 
inevitably give clues to the comprehension of life. 
• The same way the study of cellular automata and their classification 
showed that complexity can occur only in a specific range of universal 
laws (Langton, 1990), the multiplication of more and more accurate 
simulations of life —even in the absence of any new hypothesis— can 
help the discovery of unknown underlying processes and connections. 
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In this context, artificial life is a new tool for discovery, the same way the 
microscope or the telescope were on the 17th century. The growing gap between 
theory and observations is very common in the history of science and, according 
to T. Kuhn (Kuhn, 1996) it is one of the main source of paradigm shifts. The same 
way that improvements in skies observation progressively leaded from pure 
observation (T. Brahe) to empirical conceptualization (J. Kepler) and then to a 
general theory (I. Newton), or that progresses in the study of fossils led from 
Cuvier to Lamarck and Darwin, computer simulations of life provide a unique 
tool to help the construction of a general theory of life. Sooner or later, some 
experiments (computational and physical) will be so life-like that the 
philosophical interpretation of life will inevitably strongly be influenced. This 
evolution, i.e. the fact that computer simulations will satisfy a growing set of the 
intuitive properties of life, will inevitably contribute to overcome the twin 
deadlock of strong artificial life: 
 
• The problem of the capability of a computing system to reproduce any 
physical process would no longer be a deadlock. In this context, the issue 
is not to show the validity of computationalism, but only to show that a 
computing system is able to embed constructions having the properties of 
living systems. The demonstration of the feasibility of such constructions 
remains of course to be done, but the experiments we presented show that 
we are on the way toward it. 
• “[The concept of life] is an historical artifact, which varies across 
different cultures and which changes as our beliefs and preconceptions 
evolve.” (Bedau In Wheeler et al., 2002, p. 88). Computational 
constructions based on principles able to unify the intuitive properties of 
life will ease the elaboration of a scientific definition of life, but they 
should also contribute to the evolution of the cultural interpretation of 
what life is. By succeeding, this approach would empty the issue of strong 
artificial life, since life would be redefined (in some direction or other) 
according to computational results. 
 
The great physicist Andrei Linde recently declared: “We have always used 
science to improve living conditions. From now on, we must make science a tool 
to understand life, consciousness and, above all, ourselves…” (Benkirane, 2002, 
p. 376). Artificial life and attempts to demonstrate the validity (possibly) of its 
strong interpretation are unprecedented tools to help science evolve toward Linde 
wishes. 
 
Acknowledgments: We particularly thank the reviewers for their constructive 
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